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Will your orphan drug startup draw acquisition interest?
Historically, development of drugs for rare diseases has been neglected because 
of a perceived lack of return on investment. 
This began to change when the Orphan Drug 
Act (ODA) passed in the United States in 
1983, providing companies with incentives 
to develop drugs for rare diseases, including 
tax credits on trial costs, a waiver of the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) fee, 
grants for clinical trials, additional protocol 
assistance and seven years of market exclusiv-
ity. Similar rules have since been adopted in 
Europe, Japan and other regions.
The ODA generally has been considered 
successful. Since its acceptance, more than 
2,800 orphan designations have been assigned 
and more than 400 products have received 
market authorization (http://www.access-
data.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/). But 
there are a few other factors that positively 
influence the economics of orphan drug 
development: timelines are typically shorter1; 
the FDA is often more flexible with approvals 
because of the lack of alternative treatments2; 
and approved orphan drugs often require less 
marketing, have a faster uptake and are gener-
ally well reimbursed1.
All these considerations have made orphan 
drug development strategies increasingly 
popular with big pharma and venture capital 
investors—and, thus, with biotech entrepre-
neurs. But what financial rewards have startup 
orphan drug companies actually reaped, and 
how likely is it that your company will draw 
interest from big-pocketed buyers?
We set out to answer these questions and 
examined the acquisition characteristics of 
companies both with and without a rare dis-
ease focus. We were able to identify the impor-
tant acquirers, average price of purchase and 
at what stage orphan disease companies often 
get bought.
This information should help inform bioen-
trepreneurs about the orphan drug space and 
their potential futures in it.
Timelines
Our methodology (Box 1) gave us 98 mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) in 2008–2012 involv-
ing startup drug development companies. Of 
these, 28% had an orphan designation (ODN) 
on the lead compound and another 13% had 
an ODN on a product other than its lead com-
pound (Fig. 1). Hence, more than 40% of the 
acquired biotech companies had an ODN 
compound in development. It would require 
data on the number of orphan-designated 
drugs in development as a percentage of all 
drugs in pipelines to estimate the interest in 
ODN–focused companies among acquirers, 
but these data are not available. The next best 
estimate would be the number of orphan-
designated drug approvals as a percentage of 
all drug approvals. This hovered around 35% 
for 2008–20123. As the percentage of orphan-
focused acquisitions is in that same range, our 
data suggest that there is a healthy appetite for 
companies with a rare disease focus. Next, we 
set out to investigate differences in the deal 
parameters related to the ODN status of the 
lead compound. We extracted the company 
founding dates from various public sources 
and the BioCentury Online Intelligence data-
base and calculated the time from company 
Box 1  Our methodology
Our analysis made use of the HBM Partners Mergers and Acquisitions Report, which tracks 
all biotech acquisitions of both public and private companies based in the United States 
and Europe8. We identified which of the companies in the report had an orphan focus (by 
having an orphan designation from either the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or the 
European Medicines Agency on the lead compound; in the vast majority of the deals, the 
lead compound was the value driver of the deal) and restricted our analysis to the last five 
years. We curated the database to contain only drug development companies, excluding 
companies that develop diagnostics or sell over-the-counter or generic medicines or have 
platform technologies without lead compounds. We also did not incorporate acquisitions of 
well-established companies, defined as those having more than one marketed product.
On the buyer’s side, we restricted our analysis to companies that acquired at least 2 
companies in 2008–2012, allowing us to view them as active. This left us with a dataset 
of 98 acquisitions in the biotech field, for which we further completed and amended 
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Often, after acquiring an ODN, a pharma-
ceutical company will develop that same drug 
for a broader indication. Orphan-designated 
drugs such as erythropoietin and rituximab 
initially benefited from the ODA incen-
tives and subsequently became blockbust-
ers through label extension. Pharmaceutical 
after the phase 2 trial. Taken together, this 
information indicates that bioentrepreneurs 
with an orphan-focused company should 
keep in mind that acquisition timelines might 
be as long as for any other biotech; thus, their 
financing status should allow for the complete 
development of a compound in-house.
We next investigated whether development 
of an orphan drug really makes for an attrac-
tive financial investment. To get a clear picture 
on the multiples on investment, we considered 
only the privately held companies that were 
directly acquired by big pharma. We observed 
no significant differences between ODN com-
pound–driven deals and non-ODN deals. 
This included—but was not limited to—capi-
tal invested until exit (Fig. 3a), the total deal 
value split out into development stages (Fig. 3b) 
and, importantly, the multiples on total capi-
tal invested (Fig. 3c). For instance, the median 
amount invested before exit was $60 million for 
non-orphan–based companies and $51 million 
for companies with an ODN as their lead com-
pound. Also, these deals had a median return 
on invested capital of 5.8× for companies with 
an orphan designation and 5.5× for those with-
out. Because rare disease–focused companies 
were acquired at a later stage of clinical devel-
opment (Fig. 2b), our data support the notion 
that orphan drug development is less costly1. 
On the other hand, the more advanced develop-
ment stage is not reflected in total deal value or 
upfront payment and therefore does not result 
in higher multiples on the invested capital. In 
essence, this shows that in the case of an exit, 
from a purely financial standpoint it is about as 
attractive to develop drugs for a rare disease as 
it is for a more common illness. Thus, financial 
and timeline considerations should not neces-
sarily entice individuals toward, nor keep them 
away from, developing or investing in drugs for 
rare diseases.
inception to acquisition (Fig. 2a). Companies 
without an ODN on their lead compound 
had a median of eight years from founding 
to buyout—the same time to acquisition for 
companies with an orphan focus. However, 
the majority of non-orphan biotech companies 
gets acquired at phase 2, whereas orphan drug 
companies tend to get acquired at a later stage 
(Fig. 2b); more than 62% of the companies 
with an ODN on their lead were acquired at 
phase 3 or later compared with less than 33% 
of non-orphan–based companies. Therefore, 
although our data show that orphan drug 
development is indeed faster, it does not mean 
a shorter time to acquisition. This might be 
caused by acquirers needing more validation 
before betting on a compound with a per-
ceived limited market potential and possible 
difficulties related to patient recruitment. 
In addition, buyers may need more clinical 
data to embrace a new method or platform, 
especially as phase 2 trials for rare diseases 
often involve a limited number of patients. 
Alternatively, the later-stage acquisitions may 
reflect the fact that phase 3 development of 
many orphan drugs, in contrast to most non-
orphan drugs, often have smaller trials and can 
be privately financed. Bioentrepreneurs might 





































































Figure 2  Time to acquisition and phase of 
development at acquisition. (a) Time from company 
inception to acquisition. lines indicate median 
and interquartile ranges. (b) Phase of development 
of the lead compound at time of acquisition. Bars 
indicate number of acquisitions with compounds 
at that stage as a percentage of the total number of 























































































































Figure 3  Orphan designation (ODn)- and non-ODn–driven deals. (a–c) Dots indicate the deal parameters of individual companies until the company was 





ODN not on lead 
ODN on lead 
Figure 1  Orphan designation (ODn) status for 
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in 2008–2012. This is in sharp contrast with 
the many ODNs assigned to drugs developed 
by these three companies in that same period.
Another surprise is the absence of three of 
the top pharmaceutical companies, AbbVie, 
Merck and Bayer, in the list of active acquirers. 
Shire, Celgene and Biomarin—all well-known 
for their interest in drug development for rare 
diseases—placed in the top 15 active acquirers 
and acquired almost solely companies with an 
ODN. Bristol-Myers Squibb lands in the top 
five, showing a keen interest in companies with 
an orphan designation, though it has a limited 
number of assigned ODNs itself. This analy-
sis reveals that, although most pharmaceuti-
cal companies have in-house ODN programs, 
only a subset of big pharma is interested in 
acquiring orphan-designated drugs. For bio-
entrepreneurs looking to start a new venture in 
the orphan drug space, it will be important to 
develop strong inroads into this pharmaceuti-
cal subset, generate their input on development 
strategy early and closely follow their interests6.
Conclusion
Starting a company with the aim to develop 
drugs requires dedication, focus and a signifi-
cant investment of capital. For bioentrepreneurs 
(and their venture capitalist investors), it is 
important to know whether these investments 
will pay off at the end. Our analysis, which 
which pharmaceutical and biotech companies 
have interest in the orphan space. We iden-
tified the companies that received the most 
FDA-designated ODNs in 2008–2012 and 
also included their assigned ODNs from the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) (http://
ec.europa.eu/health/documents/community- 
register/html/orphreg.htm) (Fig. 4a). 
Novartis is a clear winner in both Europe and 
the United States, and it also ranks first in 
terms of orphan drug revenues (http://www.
evaluategroup.com/orphandrug2013), fol-
lowed by GlaxoSmithKline, Roche and Pfizer. 
Surprisingly, we found a large difference in the 
number of ODNs with the FDA and EMA for 
some big pharma companies. For instance, 
Roche has 15 ODNs with the FDA but none 
with the EMA.
Based on this analysis, Novartis, 
GlaxoSmithKline and Roche would appear to 
be suitable candidates for M&A discussions, 
but this is not substantiated by their number 
of acquisitions. We identified the 20 compa-
nies in our dataset that acquired most of the 
biotech startups in the last five years and cal-
culated the percentage of acquired companies 
developing orphan drugs (Fig. 4b). The biggest 
acquirer was Pfizer, followed by Gilead, Roche 
and Shire. Remarkably, neither Novartis, 
GlaxoSmithKline nor Roche acquired a com-
pany with an ODN on their lead compound 
companies—Novartis in particular—have 
now fully adopted this approach4. This holds 
especially true in cancer, in which the same 
molecular pathways often are deregulated in 
both rare and common cancers.
This interest in oncology is also reflected in 
the FDA’s ODN database. In 2008–2012, 7 of the 
10 most prevalent ODNs in the database were 
in oncology (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/opdlisting/oopd/). This is in line with 
previous research noting that since the ODA, 
oncology accounts for 33% of the total ODNs5. 
To correct for the ‘oncology ODN effect’, we 
defined a category of ‘dedicated orphan drugs’ 
being specifically developed for one or more 
related orphan indications and lacking an obvi-
ous application in a larger, non-orphan indica-
tion, and we divided the deals into dedicated 
or non-dedicated categories (Table 1). We sub-
sequently reanalyzed deal parameters—time to 
exit, stage of development and multiples on cap-
ital invested—but did not observe any signifi-
cant differences between drugs with or without 
an ODN. On the other hand, this ‘oncology 
ODN’ strategy may suit small biotechs seeking 
to develop drugs for larger markets.
Who buys orphan drug programs?
Rare disease–focused startups and bioentre-
preneurs who might be thinking about launch-
ing an orphan drug company need to know 
Table 1  Examples of dedicated and non-dedicated orphan drugs in our dataset
Company Compound Type Method of action Orphan designation Broader indication Dedicated
Kosan Tanespimycin Small molecule Heat shock protein 90 inhibitor Multiple myeloma, chronic myeloid leukemia Solid tumors no
gemin-X Obatoclax Small molecule Bcl-2 family inhibitor Chronic lymphocytic leukemia Solid tumors no
FoldRx Tafamidis Small molecule Stabilization of transthyretin Transthyretin amyloid polyneuropathy none Yes
lev 
Pharmaceuticals










































































ODN, not on lead
ODN on lead






































































































Figure 4  Most active companies and those with the most orphan designations (ODns).  (a) Bar graph of 20 companies that received the most ODns from the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 2008–2012. Shown are data from both the FDA and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca +  
MedImmune; Celgene: Celgene + Abraxis; Eisai: Eisai + Morphotek; Eli lilly: Eli lilly + ImClone; gSK: glaxoSmithKline + Stiefel; J&J: Johnson & Johnson + 
Janssen + Centocor; novartis: novartis + Alcon; Pfizer: Pfizer + Wyeth + Pharmacia + King; Roche: Roche + genentech; Sanofi: Sanofi + genzyme; Takeda: 
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now, this may change in the future and could 
negatively impact deal terms. This may espe-
cially hold true for compounds that have limited 
clinical benefit or are not disease modifying.
Our analysis also reveals that despite a broad 
interest from big pharma in obtaining ODNs, 
only a limited set of players acquires rare 
disease–focused companies. Rare disease– 
focused bioentrepreneurs should therefore 
keep a close watch on the wish list of this lim-
ited group and seek a strategic fit6. To further 
enhance their success rate, these bioentrepre-
neurs should include regulatory advice and 
engage with the authorities as early as pos-
sible, thereby laying a clear path toward final 
success.
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focused on M&A in 2008–2012, indicates 
that—from a financial point of view—no large 
differences exist between the development of 
orphan and non-orphan drugs. Development 
of orphan drugs is cheaper and faster, but this 
benefit is offset by acquisition at a later stage. A 
decision to invest or start a venture in orphan 
drug development should—as with drugs for 
common diseases—be driven mainly by assess-
ments of risk and chance of success. Here it 
should be noted that we have not looked at 
attrition rates for orphan and non-orphan 
drug development, as it is virtually impossible 
to obtain data on drug development ongoing in 
all privately held companies. However, attrition 
rates would clearly have an important impact on 
the return of capital invested. Another impor-
tant consideration is pricing of orphan drugs—
a subject of continuous debate5,7. Although 
high reimbursement prices are accepted for 
Startups on the menu
In 2009, Stanford University’s Robert Malenka and Thomas Südhof gave 
a presentation at the San Francisco SciCafé proposing the use of short 
hairpin RNAs as a means to more rapidly identify the role of synap-
tic proteins in disease pathophysiology. Malenka pioneered the study 
of several proteins that alter the efficacy of neurotransmission across 
synapses, providing insights into the addictive effects of drugs, such as 
cocaine and amphetamines; Südhof ’s work on mechanisms for neu-
rotransmitter release and the calcium-controlled fusion of 
synaptic vesicles in the presynaptic terminal was recently 
awarded a Nobel Prize. In 2010, Malenka and Südhof 
were among the cofounders of neurology startup Circuit 
Therapeutics, based in Menlo Park, California. Malenka 
talked to Nature Biotechnology about his experience.
Nature Biotechnology: When did you first get 
involved with Circuit Therapeutics?
Robert Malenka: I had been on the scientific advisory 
board for several biotechs and pharma firms over the 
previous 15 years and had looked at jobs in pharma, so for a while I 
was also considering founding my own company. One day I started 
brainstorming with my friend Karoly Nikolich, and it didn’t take us 
too long to think about asking Karl Deisseroth and Tom Südhof to 
join. Karl had been my postdoc, and it was obvious that optogenetics 
had huge potential. Tom was a close scientific collaborator and was the 
world’s leading molecular synaptic biologist—he’d just won the Nobel 
Prize. After some discussion, we additionally asked Scott Delp, chair 
of Stanford’s Bioengineering Department, to join. That was our five-
member founding team. We were fortunate to find a wealthy angel 
investor who understood our ambitious vision, and we were off and 
running with further support from Stanford University.
NBT: How did you identify the programs in your lab most ame-
nable for translation?
RM: As a clinical psychiatrist and a frequent advisor to industry, 
I was well aware of the challenges researchers faced in trying to 
develop novel approaches to drug discovery for brain disorders. 
My own lab’s work was directly relevant, since we work on cir-
cuit and synaptic mechanisms that contribute to various forms of 
pathological experience–dependent plasticity, which 
are of direct relevance to many brain disorders. In 
many ways this is translated through my current role 
at Circuit as chair of the scientific advisory board, 
which allows me to meet with Circuit employees 
fairly frequently and have many informal e-mail 
conversations about the science and ways to take it 
forward.
NBT: What lessons have you taken from your 
experience at Circuit?
RM: I’ve learned that you never stop learning and need to be very 
facile in thinking about what your company might do and is doing. 
There’s never too much feedback or advice; one must solicit input 
from many different, experienced [venture capitalists] and entre-
preneurs with different types of backgrounds. At the same time, 
one needs to believe in one’s own vision and intuitions. In retro-
spect, I think Circuit could have been a bit more disciplined in its 
early activities and tried to do too much. On the other hand, with 
a recent, successful series B funding and external collaborations 
being seriously discussed, Circuit is in good shape with outstand-
ing leadership. It will be very exciting to see where the company 
is two years from now.
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